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Collective Branding and the Origins of  
Investment Management Regulation: 1936-1942 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines how market and political forces interacted to create the American 
mutual fund industry and its regulation between 1936 and 1942. Contrary to previous scholarly work, 
this paper argues that the key elements of regulation that now differentiate modern mutual funds from 
modern hedge funds had their origins in lobbying by the mutual fund industry itself, rather than in 
populist or public-spirited forces in the SEC or the Roosevelt administration. The largest funds 
desired to maintain an industry-wide brand for a passive, low-risk style of investing and they sought 
regulation to maintain this brand. They did so even though some investors rationally might have 
preferred risky or active styles of investing that regulation ultimately prohibited. An understanding of 
the industry’s brand-building motivations can explain several puzzling features of mutual fund 
regulation, including restrictions on borrowing, redemption rights and control over portfolio 
companies. The mutual fund industry was able to achieve strong agreement on how to influence 
regulation because the industry had grown into its modern shape well before Congress adopted the 
current regulatory regime. Evidence from portfolios, for example, shows that mutual funds in the late 
1930s were just as passive with respect to the governance of their portfolio companies as mutual 
funds are today. This paper also examines the key distinguishing feature of modern mutual fund 
taxation—actual, rather than nominal, distribution of income to shareholders—and shows that it may 
have originated in an attempt by open-end mutual funds to drain assets from closed-end mutual funds. 
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This paper considers a simple but foundational question: why do we regulate investment 
managers and investment vehicles? The importance of the question is enormous. Mutual funds, 
hedge funds, private equity funds and other investment vehicles collectively hold trillions of 
dollars in investment securities. Indeed, mutual funds alone hold assets worth $12 trillion—
almost as much as the commercial banking industry1—and they own a quarter of American 
public companies’ common stock and almost half of America’s short-term corporate debt.2 
Mutual funds now comprise one fifth of America’s household financial assets and are the 
primary vehicle through which families and individuals invest in the financial markets.3  
Questions about why we regulate investment managers are particularly urgent at this 
moment in the nation’s history, because the regulatory status of many types of investment 
vehicles has recently become deeply unsettled and open to question. The last two decades have 
witnessed explosive growth among hedge funds, private equity funds and other alternative 
investment vehicles. Like mutual funds, these alternative vehicles are pools of stocks, bonds and 
other investment securities. But unlike mutual funds, these alternative vehicles solicit 
investments only from wealthy individuals and institutions, rather than from the general public, 
and are therefore not subject to the extensive federal regulation that applies to mutual funds. 
These alternative vehicles’ freedom from regulation gives them the ability to engage in a wide 
range of activities that would be prohibited to mutual funds. Since these alternative vehicles did 
not exist at the time the foundations of investment management regulation were laid, their 
spectacular growth in recent years has raised basic questions about what mutual fund regulation 
is supposed to accomplish and whether its original purposes continue to be relevant.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, 9 fig.1.1 (2010); Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release, Large Commercial Banks, September 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/.  
2 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 11 fig.1.4 (2009) 
3 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 10 fig. 1.2 (2010); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail 




The goal of this paper is thus to recover those original purposes. I describe the political and 
market forces that shaped the early mutual fund industry and brought into being the laws that 
now form the backbone of investment management regulation. These laws include the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 and a contemporaneous series of tax statutes passed between 
1936 and 1942. 
Because the regulatory regime established by these statutes is highly invasive and reaches 
well beyond disclosure, it is commonly believed that the origins of these statutes lay in political 
forces outside of the investment management industry.4 Most prominently, Mark Roe has argued 
that restrictions on mutual funds’ ability to take control stakes in the companies in which they 
invest reflected, at least in large part, anti-Wall Street populists’ and industrial company 
managers’ efforts to prevent the Wall Street barons who controlled mutual funds from also 
gaining control of Main Street operating businesses by using mutual funds to buy up controlling 
stakes in those operating businesses.5 Roe argues that the influence of populism on mutual fund 
regulation was so profound that populism is one of the key elements responsible for having 
“created” the mutual fund industry as we know it today.6  
This paper focuses, in contrast, on the way that the mutual fund industry created its own 
regulation. I show that by the late 1930’s, market forces had spontaneously produced a version of 
the mutual fund that looked surprisingly similar to modern mutual funds. These funds had 
fundamentally different business models from the holding companies with which they have often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See, e.g., Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment Company Act as a Regulatory 
Screen, 13 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 289 (2008) (“Congress designed the Act to address the particular abuses 
associated with companies comprised of liquid pools of securities, including disadvantageous transactions with 
affiliates, extreme leveraging, excessive fees, inordinately complex capital structures, unfairly differential treatment 
of shareholders, and inflated values.”) 
5 See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 102-123 (1994); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in 
the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (1991). Stuart Banner has argued that popular 
suspicion of securities markets underlay nearly all Anglo-American securities regulation initiatives since the late-
17th century. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 849 
(1997). 




been confused by Roe and others, and they had almost no interest in exercising control over the 
companies in which they invested. These funds thus comprised a clearly distinct industry. And 
rather than watching as regulation was shaped by outside forces, the mutual fund industry 
actively controlled the design of its regulation. Indeed, it appears, somewhat paradoxically, that 
mutual funds actually desired for their own purposes many of the most invasive restrictions on 
borrowing, control over portfolio companies, and redemption rights. There is also evidence that 
elements of industry sought the annual income distribution requirement that has become the key 
distinguishing feature of mutual funds’ tax status and which now places heavy burdens on the 
industry. The vigor of the mutual fund industry’s support for invasive aspects of regulation is 
surprising, because the industry had substantial political power to oppose regulation between 
1936 and 1942.  
The industry’s puzzling support for regulation has many possible explanations.7 This paper 
highlights a kind of industry-wide standardization or “collective branding” effort. Mutual funds 
were marketed broadly to the general public in the 1930s, and many funds responded to popular 
tastes, as well as to practical realities in the funds’ management structures, by self-consciously 
cultivating images of passivity and conservatism. Many funds lacked faith in their capacity to 
build this image individually, however, because they believed that mass-market investors lacked 
the time and sophistication to distinguish among various types of funds. Fund managers believed 
that investors’ perceptions of individual funds could affect their perceptions of the whole 
industry. The industry’s reputation was therefore viewed as a kind of collective asset. And like 
many collective assets, this asset posed collective action problems.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There may be some room for populism in explaining this phenomenon, but not in precisely the way Roe and others 
have argued. I argue below that if populism influenced mutual fund regulation, it did so indirectly through the 
influence of the mutual fund industry. That is, populism may have shaped investors’ preferences and the industry 
may have then responded by using law to help build a brand that would appeal to those preferences. Even this role 
for populism is limited, however, since the industry also had practical reasons for structuring itself the way it did in 




The solution to these problems was mandatory industry-wide standardization. This 
standardization reached beyond the disclosure and anti-fraud measures that are present in the 
ordinary securities laws and prohibited many operational strategies that at least a few investors 
might rationally have preferred, such as high borrowing, less frequent redemption and control 
over portfolio companies. Mutual funds, in other words, sought more than just “bonding” or 
“certification” to establish a reputation for honesty; they sought “branding” to establish a 
reputation for a particular and contestable approach to asset management.  
This paper also explores the origins of a provision of tax law that forces mutual funds to 
distribute their income every year, rather than merely to pass through gains and losses on a 
notional basis, the way hedge funds are allowed to do.8 The requirement generates significant 
costs for modern taxable mutual fund investors and has propelled the recent rise of exchange-
traded funds (or “ETFs”).9 The requirement’s origins may lay partly in an effort by one set of 
mutual funds (open-end funds) to bleed away the assets of another set of mutual funds (closed-
end funds) and also partly in the accidental coincidence in 1936 of mutual fund tax reform with 
an attempt by the Roosevelt administration to force all corporations to distribute their income 
annually. 
This historical analysis has several implications for modern theory and policy. The most 
important is that it provides a broad framework for understanding and evaluating the general 
purposes of modern investment management regulation. It suggests that the branding and 
standardization dynamic that initially shaped key elements of mutual fund regulation may now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The tax code relevant to modern investment company taxation appears at 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-855. See generally M. 
Barclay, N. Pearson & M. Weisbach, Open-end Mutual Funds and Capital Gains Taxes, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1998); 
BNA Tax Management Portfolio, Taxation of Regulated Investment Companies, No. 740-2nd. 
9 John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 5-18 (2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311945; William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and 
Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 




have ambiguous consequences for investors. Mutual funds and the regulation that apply to them 
were developed for the mass market. This is why mutual funds are now the primary vehicles 
through which households invest in the financial markets. The brand-building elements of 
regulation therefore almost certainly help investors to some extent by standardizing many 
features of mutual funds and thereby making it easier for unsophisticated investors to identify 
and understand the differences between funds. Indeed, the overlap between brand-building and 
investor protection purposes is one of the most remarkable—and encouraging—aspects of the 
story of how investment management regulation began. But branding-building and investor 
protection are not exactly the same thing. Standardization carries significant costs because many 
investors rationally might prefer funds that engage in many of the practices that mutual fund 
regulation now prohibits. That is, some investors might prefer a brand different from the one that 
regulation adopted.  
This study also has much to tell us about the governance of modern large public operating 
companies. Mutual funds invest heavily in public companies and own about a quarter of their 
outstanding equity. Mutual funds nevertheless tend overwhelmingly to be passive and 
uninvolved in the governance of these companies. Because greater activism by mutual funds 
might help to remedy some of the agency conflicts that plague these companies, the reasons for 
mutual funds’ passivity have been debated extensively. Regulation is commonly blamed as the 
source of mutual funds’ passivity, and the impact of regulation at the time that it was adopted has 
thus become an important element of modern debates.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate 
Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate 
America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225 (2007); Edward B. 
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). But 
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. 




This paper presents data from mutual funds’ portfolios in 1940 as well as other evidence to 
show that no companies that were at any risk of being swept up in the mutual fund regulatory 
and tax regime had any significant interest in controlling the operating companies in which they 
invested. Unlike the entrepreneurs who built holding companies that took large control stakes in 
subsidiaries, the entrepreneurs who built mutual funds were not managers or shareholders, but 
salesmen and securities dealers. They therefore had neither the ability nor the desire to control 
the companies in which their funds invested; their expertise lay only in sales.  
Lastly, the insights in this paper about the political origins of the annual income distribution 
requirement in tax law add urgency to recent calls for reform of this requirement.11 The fact that 
the requirement originated partly in rent-seeking and historical accident suggests that proposals 
for reform should be taken seriously.  
This paper offers several other insights, including, for example, an explanation of why the 
modern closed-end mutual fund industry is so much smaller than the modern open-end mutual 
fund industry, a demonstration that closed-end mutual funds in the late-1920s bore an eerie 
resemblance to modern securitized mortgage pools, and a description of how the sudden 
outbreak of World War II at a key moment in the legislative history of the Investment Company 
Act imperiled the Act’s passage and forced the mutual fund industry to lobby hard to save it. 
This paper builds on descriptive work on the history of asset managers by Tamar Frankel and 
Ann Taylor Schwing, Matthew Fink, Natalie Grow, Joel Seligman, and Michael Yogg.12 The 
primary contribution of this paper is to document the extent of the mutual fund industry’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Coates, supra note 9. 
12 MATTHEW FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS (2007); TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, 1 THE 
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 1.02[B]; Roe, supra note 5; JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
WALL STREET (3d ed. 2003); MICHAEL R. YOGG, PASSION FOR REALITY: PAUL CABOT AND THE BOSTON MUTUAL 
FUND (2008); Natalie R. Grow, The “Boston-Type Open-End Fund”—Development of a National Financial 
Institution: 1924-1940 (April 30, 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). As I was working on 
this paper, John Armour and Brian Cheffins also documented a dearth of corporate activism by early mutual funds 
that supports my findings here. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive” Shareholder Activism 




support for regulation and to construct a political economic account, centered in the collective 
branding theory, for how and why this support became so powerful. I also construct a more 
focused narrative of how modern mutual funds came to differ from modern hedge funds and I 
document for the first time mutual funds’ passivity with respect to their portfolio companies. 
Because this paper relies mostly on primary sources, it also contributes many purely historical 
and narrative insights.  
I. The mutual fund industry in the late 1930s 
The chief source of data on the mutual fund industry in the 1930s is the SEC’s study on 
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies.13 The study was commissioned by Congress in 
Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The political operations that 
gave rise to Section 30 are unclear,14 but the section gave the SEC the authority and momentum 
to write and propose to Congress the initial draft of the Investment Company Act (the “ICA”).  
A. The state of the industry 
1. Closed-end funds 
Figures 1 and 2 (on the next two pages) distill the mutual fund industry’s changes from 
1927 to 1940. Prior to 1927, mutual funds comprised a new and very small industry.15 The 
industry began growing quickly in 1927 with the rise of closed-end funds. Closed-end funds are 
pools of investment securities similar to the ordinary open-end funds that now dominate the 
mutual fund industry. The primary difference between closed- and open-end funds is that open-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The entities now known as “mutual funds” were generally known as “investment trusts” in the 1920s and early 
1930s, and “investment companies” in the late 1930s and 1940s. SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES (1939-1942) [hereinafter SEC Study]. 
14 Robert Healy, the SEC Commissioner who oversaw the investment trust study, suggested that Congress was 
moved to pass Section 30 of the PUHCA not just by concern for investment company investors “but also by the 
suspicion that there might exist upstairs, above the utility holding companies, various investment trusts which had 
not been examined by the Federal Trade Commission in the public utility field.” A Bill to Provide for the 
Registration of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. Of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 36 (Statement of Robert Healy) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearings].  




end funds allow shareholders to redeem their shares, and closed-end funds do not.16 Closed-end 
fund investors must buy and sell their shares in markets.  
 
Source: SEC Study, Part 2 190 tbl.60. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a general exploration of the consequences of redemption rights, see John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit 









1927	   1928	   1929	   1930	   1931	   1932	   1933	   1934	   1935	   1936	  
Figure	  1.	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Sources: SEC Study Part 2 at 112-113 tbl.17; INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 96 (1962) 
 
While the open-end fund industry remained very small throughout the 1920s, the closed-
end fund industry grew spectacularly. In 1929—the year of the great bull market—interests in 
closed-end funds comprised more than 30% of all new corporate securities issues in the United 
States.17 Closed-end funds generally sold a mix of equity, funded debt and preferred stock of 
varying levels of seniority.18 The SEC estimated that debt and preferred stock accounted for 
approximately 56% of the total assets of all leveraged closed-end funds in 1929.19 This probably 
understates the actual degree of economic leverage, however, because closed-end funds were 
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18 SEC Study, Part 2, at 45, 47. 
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owned through elaborate pyramid structures that magnified leverage at each level of the 
structures.20  
Prior to the stock market crash in October 1929, almost all leveraged closed-end funds 
traded at premiums to the net asset value (NAV) of their securities. NAV is the pro rata portion 
of a fund’s assets that corresponds to each share. Shares in closed-end funds were commonly 
worth more than the securities that ultimately underlay them. Premiums averaged about 50% in 
1929, and the hottest new issues sometimes traded at 200% of NAV.21 Pyramidal holding 
structures magnified the premium to NAV at each level.22  
Closed-end funds relied on a very different business model from the holding companies 
with which they have often been compared, and closed-end funds formed a naturally distinct 
industry that was easily identifiable by contemporary observers.23 Unlike closed-end funds’ 
founders, holding companies’ founders were shareholders and operations managers. Holding 
company founders generated value by managing and capitalizing their operating subsidiaries 
effectively and by participating in the profits by owning shares in the holding companies. 
Holding companies therefore only sold shares as a way of financing their operating businesses so 
that they could operate at the optimal scale. The primary goal of the people who built holding 
companies, in other words, was operating profit, and they sold securities merely as a means to 
this end. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See generally SEC Study, Part 2, at 527-600. To see why the SEC’s statistic understated economic leverage, 
imagine that the public contributes $100 to Fund A, which in turn invests the full amount in Fund B, which has no 
other equity. Fund A borrows $50 and so does Fund B. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that these funds are not 
consolidated, on paper they have $300 in combined total assets and $100 in debt—a ratio of debt to total assets of 
33%. The actual equity contributed by the public, however, is only $100, so the effective ratio of debt to total assets 
in the combined companies is 50%. This is how pyramiding magnified leverage. 
21 See SEC Study Part 2, at 805-818; FINK, supra note 12, at 10 n.5; JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 
1929, 43-65 (1988). 
22 If Fund A traded at two times net asset value and bought shares in Fund B, which also traded at two times net 
asset value, Fund A investors would, in effect, pay four times the value of the assets that ultimately underlay their 
shares.  




Closed-end funds, in contrast, made the sale of securities an end in itself. Unlike the 
holding company managers, closed-end fund managers had a separate corporate existence and a 
separate set of owners from the entities that held the funds’ assets. The overwhelming majority 
of closed-end fund assets in 1929 resided in funds sponsored by sales experts who had their own 
corporate existences: professional underwriters, brokerages, commercial banks and trust 
companies, bank affiliates, and investment counselors, as well as combinations of these.24 
Closed-end funds were the first pooled investment vehicles to target household investors, and in 
the 1920s and 1930s, closed-end funds developed extensive nationwide sales forces that made 
buying shares very simple. As explained below,25 the sales experts who built closed-end funds 
had little interest in operating or influencing the businesses in which they invested because such 
activities lay far outside the boundaries of these sales experts’ abilities. Closed-end funds were 
simply a vehicle for harnessing their promoters’ expertise in sales and marketing.  
Since the value that closed-end funds generated lay in the superior marketing and sales 
expertise of their promoters, their revenue was tied primarily to the success of their sales efforts, 
rather than to the success of their investments. Underwriting fees were typically on the order of 
6% of the value of new issues.26 Ongoing management fees were much smaller, but they also 
rewarded sales because they were charged as a percentage of the total amount of assets a fund 
managed. This encouraged the accumulation of additional assets through sales of new shares. 
Closed-end fund promoters also profited from the spread between the cost of assembling closed-
end funds and the prices at which the funds could be sold. Since closed-end funds traded at a 
premium to NAV, their creation and sale involved a simple form of arbitrage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 SEC Study Part 2, at 57. 
25 Infra Section IV.A. 




In fact, closed-end funds in the 1920s and 1930s bore an astonishing resemblance to 
modern securitized mortgage and financial asset pools, which are commonly known as 
collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. Like modern CDOs, closed-end funds piled multi-
layered capital structures on top of pools of assembled securities. Additionally, like promoters of 
securitized mortgage pools, the promoters of closed-end funds were sales experts and 
underwriters, rather than portfolio or operations managers, and they had a separate corporate 
existence and a separate set of owners from the vehicles they assembled. Closed-end fund 
promoters profited mostly from the fees and arbitrage opportunities that lay in the funds’ 
packaging and sale, rather than from the funds’ ongoing management or financial success. 
Closed-end funds were also marketed on a massive scale—recall that closed-end funds 
comprised 30% of all new issues in 1929.27 Closed-end funds’ tendency to invest in other closed-
end funds caused them even to resemble modern CDOs-squared. And like modern CDOs, 
closed-end funds surely helped to inflate the prices of the assets (common stocks) that underlay 
them. They also turned out to be very hard to value.28  
The closed-end fund industry collapsed spectacularly in 1929, as the value of the common 
stocks in their portfolios plummeted in the great crash. By the end of 1930, most leveraged 
closed-end funds were insolvent.29 Additionally, the shares of the funds that had managed to 
avoid insolvency began trading at prices below their NAVs. By the end of 1931, the average 
discount for closed-end funds without significant leverage was 40% from the value of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 SEC Study Part 2, at 186 tbl.59.  
28 To be sure, the reasons for valuation problems in CDOs and closed-end funds are quite different. In CDOs, the 
trouble is that the underlying assets are hard to value. In closed-end funds, the underlying assets were supremely 
easy to value—they were usually exchange-listed stocks with readily available quotations.  




portfolios.30 Most closed-end funds continue to trade at a discount even today for reasons that 
modern financial economists are still debating.31  
The market crash of 1929 exposed a range of practices that damaged the public reputation of 
closed-end funds for years afterward. Many of these practices were simply fraudulent. Some 
funds turned out to be Ponzi schemes.32 Others changed managers without notifying 
shareholders, became “dumping grounds” for unmarketable securities issues underwritten by 
affiliated bankers, dealt directly with managers in undisclosed transactions on clearly unfair 
terms and gave sponsors and managers shares at below-market prices without disclosure. 
As Figure 1 indicates, the discount made issuing new common stock virtually impossible for 
closed-end funds after 1930. The assets required to produce a new closed-end fund share cost 
more than the share could be sold for in the market. The persistence of the discount up to the 
present time is very likely the main reason why the closed-end fund industry has become 
insignificant in comparison to the open-end fund industry.33 The discount also reversed the 
incentives that originally produced pyramidal ownership and byzantine capital structures. 
Pyramidal ownership magnified discounts to NAV in the same way it had magnified premiums 
before the crash. The period after 1930, therefore, saw the purchase and subsequent liquidation 
of many closed-end funds by other closed-end funds or other buyers.34 The discount also 
dramatically reduced closed-end fund borrowing.35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 SEC Study Part 2, at 322. 
31 See generally Charles M. C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds, 
4 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 153 (1990); Elroy Dimson & Carolina Minio-Kozerski, Closed-End Funds: A Survey, 8 
FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS No. 2 (1999). 
32 Part 3 of the SEC study devoted several thousand pages to describing the practices mentioned here.  
33 This is also why proposals by Gilson and Kraakman and others to make closed-end funds into active participants 
in corporate governance are unworkable. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 10. It is simply too difficult to convince 
anyone to buy newly issued shares in a closed-end fund.  
34 Two closed-end funds, in particular, Atlas Corporation and The Equity Corporation, grew rapidly after the crash 
by exchanging their common stock for that of target closed-end funds trading at large discounts and then merging 




2. Open-end funds 
In the mid-1930s, the gap left by the collapse of the closed-end fund industry was filled by 
open-end funds.36 Open-end funds solved the discount problem by making a standing offer to 
redeem and sell their shares at NAV.37 Open-end mutual funds now dominate the mutual fund 
industry.38 Figure 2 (above) shows that open-end funds were minor players in comparison to 
closed-end funds when the Revenue Act of 1936 was passed, but had become major players by 
the time of the Investment Company Act of 1940.39  
Open-end funds were also distinguished from closed-end funds by the simplicity of their 
capital structures. Unlike closed-end funds, open-end funds generally issued only common stock 
until the late 1930s.  
Although open-end funds were not built by professional brokers or underwriters, as closed-
end funds were, they were built by professional managers who maintained separate corporate 
existences and separate sets of owners from the funds they managed. The fund managers’ 
business models also emphasized sales in a manner similar to those of closed-end funds. 
Through the 1930s, open-end funds were mostly organized by small groups of individuals whose 
primary business was the sale and management of the funds they organized. Fee structures 
heavily emphasized sales. At the end of 1935, sales loads higher than 9 percent were common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the value of the assets underlying the stock. Senate Hearings, at 81-131; SEC Study Part 2, at 85-88; HUGH 
BULLOCK, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 52-55, 59, 61 (1959). 
35 SEC Study Part 2, at 195 tbl.61. 
36 The early 1930s saw the marketing of several types of more exotic instruments that became unmarketable by 
1936. Fixed trusts were similar to modern index mutual funds, with redeemable shares and fixed portfolios. The 
reasons for their decline are unclear, but by 1933, they had effectively stopped issuing securities. SEC Study Part 1, 
at 29-31. Face-amount installment certificates and installment investment plans had also enjoyed brief periods of 
popularity in the early 1930s, but had also become insignificant forces in the industry by 1936. SEC Study Part 1, at 
31-33. Common trust funds were not important in the late 1930s. 
37 See Morley & Curtis, supra note 16. 
38 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 9 fig.1.1. 




among open-end funds.40 And annual management fees were charged as a percentage of total 
assets under management—usually on the order of 1.5 percent annually—which encouraged the 
accumulation of additional assets through sales of new shares.41 Shares were sold primarily 
through professional dealers.42 By 1940, the largest open-end funds had shareholders all across 
the country43 and had attained their size primarily through the effectiveness and national scale of 
their sales operations.  
From open-end funds’ inception in the mid-1920s and up through the early 1940s, the open-
end fund industry was heavily concentrated among a few funds centered in Boston.44 In 1936, 
three Boston-based funds—Incorporated Investors, State Street Investment Corporation and 
Massachusetts Investors Trust, or MIT—collectively held more than 60% of all open-end fund 
assets, and MIT alone held more than 30%.45  
In the late-1930s, as now, both open- and closed-end funds appealed primarily to small 
individual investors.46 More than half of the outstanding common stock of the five largest open-
end mutual funds was held by investors owning shares worth $1,000 or less and 90 percent of the 
outstanding stock was in the hands of investors holding shares worth $5,000 or less.47 Closed-
end funds had ceased marketing their shares by the early 1930s, but their shares nevertheless 
appear to have remained primarily in the hands of small investors.48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 SEC Part 2, at 217 tbl.63. 
41 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, at 226-227.  
42 Grow, supra note 12. 
43 SEC Study Part 2, at 397. 
44 Grow, supra note 12 at 421 tbl.26. 
45 See SEC Part 2 at 126 tbl.26; Grow, supra note 12, at 304 tbl.18. For a history of these three funds, see generally 
Id., at 335-442.  
46 See generally SEC Study Part 2, at 378-398. 
47 Id., at 386 tbl.116. 
48 Id.; J. Bradford De Long and Andrei Shleifer, The Stock Market Bubble of 1929: Evidence from Closed-end 




B. Competition from substitute forms of saving and investing 
The mutual fund industry was still struggling for a significant share of the total market for 
individual saving and investing, however. In the mid-1930s, individuals who invested in 
securities tended overwhelmingly to do so directly, rather than through mutual funds. The SEC 
estimated that at the end of 1935 only approximately 15% of individuals who invested in the 
stock market did so even partly through mutual funds.49 Additionally, many individual savers 
simply chose not to invest their savings in any form of security.50 Mutual funds have a far larger 
share of the household investing market today.51  
II. The Investment Company Act and the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1942 
This part describes briefly the histories of the three statutes that laid the foundations of 
modern mutual fund regulation and taxation: the ICA and the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1942. 
This basic history lays the groundwork for the discussion of the interplay between industry and 
non-industry political forces in Parts III and IV.  
A. The Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1942 
There are two major themes to this section: First, the annual income distribution requirement 
that originated in 1936 was proposed by open-end funds and was made politically feasible partly 
by the Roosevelt Administration’s attempt that same year to apply the distribution system to all 
companies. Second, although both neither open- nor closed-end funds requested the limits on 
control over portfolio companies that first appeared in 1936, both types of funds accepted and 
significantly shaped these limits. There is very little evidence that the administration or anyone 
else imbued these control limits with populist political meaning. 
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University). 




1. A brief introduction to mutual fund taxation 
In the absence of special tax treatment, mutual fund shareholders would be subject to triple 
taxation: once at the portfolio company level, once at the fund level and once more at the 
shareholder level. Today, to avoid paying corporate income tax, mutual funds must register 
under the ICA and meet two requirements.52 First, they must distribute their income annually.53 
Mutual funds achieve pass-through status only by deducting from their income the amounts they 
actually distribute to shareholders. In contrast, true “pass-through” tax status, such as that 
enjoyed by partnerships (including hedge funds), allows an entity to pass through tax liabilities 
and benefits to its owners in a purely notional fashion, without ever actually transferring 
ownership of any assets.  
The tax burden generated by the distribution requirement creates a set of well-known 
problems for open-end funds.54 For example, unlike hedge funds and other partnerships, mutual 
funds are unable to pass through net tax losses to their shareholders, since there is no literal way 
to distribute losses (hedge funds and other partnerships pass through losses on a purely notional 
basis).55 Exchange-traded funds are appealing primarily because of their claimed ability to 
minimize portfolio turnover and thus the tax realization events that generate taxable 
distributions.56 
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Barclay, N. Pearson & M. Weisbach, Open-end Mutual Funds and Capital Gains Taxes, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1998); 
Coates, supra note 9. 
53 26 U.S.C. § 852. 
54 Coates, supra note 9, at 5-18. 
55 Tax losses are not always reflected in share prices, since realization requirements divorce the timing of tax gains 
and losses from the timing of actual gains and losses. It is possible, for example, for a fund’s NAV to rise in a given 
year even while it realizes tax losses in excess of its realized tax gains. In such a circumstance, the tax losses will go 
to waste. Jack Mintz and Michael Smart 
56 See generally Birdthistle, supra note 9. Exchange-traded funds minimize distributions by minimizing portfolio 




The second important requirement of modern mutual fund taxation is that mutual funds must 
fragment their portfolios in ways that restrict what I call the “breadth” and “depth” of investing.57 
Fifty percent of a mutual fund’s portfolio is divided into a regulated bucket, in which 
investments in no single issuer’s securities can comprise more than 5% of the mutual fund’s total 
portfolio (a “breadth” requirement), and in which the mutual fund does not own more than 10% 
of the outstanding voting securities of any single issuer (a “depth” limitation). There is also a 
separate requirement that not more than 25% of a fund’s portfolio can be invested in the 
securities of any one issuer or the securities of two or more issuers which the mutual fund 
controls.  
2. The Revenue Act of 1936 
The mutual fund tax provisions in the Revenue Act of 1936 were the products of a tightly 
organized lobbying effort by three open-end funds based in Boston that together dominated the 
open-end fund industry in 1936: State Street Investment Corporation, Incorporated Investors and 
Massachusetts Investors Trust (MIT).58 The influence of these three funds on the mutual fund 
taxation provisions in 1936 was so substantial that Paul Cabot, the President of the State Street 
Investment Corporation, was not exaggerating when he said many years later, “God, I practically 
wrote the law.”59 
Prior to 1935, the triple taxation issue presented problems for mutual funds because they had 
to pay capital gains tax.60 These problems were aggravated in June of 1935 when the President 
proposed for the first time requiring corporations to pay tax on ordinary income in the form of 
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R.J. Tosiello, 9, Oct. 22, 1978 [Hereinafter Tosiello-Cabot Interview]. Grow, Yogg and Fink have all written 
generally about the history of the Revenue Act of 1936. Supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
59 Tosiello-Cabot interview.  
60 Revision of Revenue Laws 1938: Hearings on H.R. 9682 Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 75th Cong. 




dividends received from other corporations.61 In his message to accompany the proposed bill, the 
President said unapologetically that part of the intercorporate dividend tax’s purpose was to 
discourage large holding company structures.62 But the President stated expressly that mutual 
funds were not a target. He said, “Bona fide investment trusts that submit to public regulation 
and perform the function of permitting small investors to obtain the benefit of diversification of 
risk may well be exempted from this tax.”63  
For reasons that are unclear, the Revenue Act of 1935 passed without an exemption for 
mutual funds. But by the end of 1935, the three large Boston-based funds that dominated the 
open-end fund industry had begun devising a legislative strategy to avoid corporate income tax.64 
The funds saw a concrete opportunity when the President proposed a new tax bill in 1936 that 
included the now-infamous undistributed corporate earnings tax.65 Before the debate over the 
1936 Act began the three open-end funds sought influence with David Walsh, a Democratic 
Senator from Massachusetts who sat on the Senate Finance Committee.66  
When the Revenue Act of 1936 first passed the House, it appeared that the mutual funds’ tax 
problems would largely solve themselves. As originally proposed to the House, the bill would 
have allowed all corporations—including ordinary operating companies—to deduct from income 
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general background on the Revenue Act of 1935, see Harley L. Lutz, The Federal Revenue Act of 1935, 26 AM. 
ECON. REV. 161 (1936).  
62 The President’s Message to Congress Urging Increased Taxes on Wealth, WASH. POST, June 20, 1935, at 1. See 
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63 The President’s Message to Congress Urging Increased Taxes on Wealth, WASH. POST, June 20, 1935, at 1. 
64 The effort began in August 1935, when Cabot met with James Landis, then chair of the SEC. Senate Hearings, at 
1076. According to Cabot’s account, Landis said that because of its imminent investigation, the SEC would not take 
a formal position on the tax measure. Cabot later heard through a friend who worked for Landis that Landis opposed 
the open-end funds’ efforts in 1936. Transcript of Interview with Paul C. Cabot, Conducted by Jessica Holland, 68-
69 (1980). 
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all amounts they distributed to shareholders.67 This proposal would have effectively ended the 
corporate income tax. The House passed the bill in the form proposed by the Administration and 
when the bill first reached the Senate, the open-end funds supported it with only one proposed 
revision that is unimportant for my purposes.68  
The special tax treatment for mutual funds came into being because the Senate rejected the 
House bill and insisted on retaining the basic income tax even for companies that distributed 
their income. The Senate proposed instead to impose the undistributed earnings tax only as a 
kind of penalty in addition to the basic income tax. With the basic income tax appearing likely to 
remain intact, the open-end funds had to shift their efforts to obtaining some special provision 
that would allow them to avoid it.  
The funds asked Walsh to submit for the record a memorandum proposing that the 
distribution requirement as originally requested by the Administration for all companies should 
be retained just for open-end mutual funds.69 The memo notably suggested that favorable tax 
treatment be given to open-end funds and not to closed-end funds.70  
Five days after Walsh entered the new memorandum into the legislative record, Arthur H. 
Kent, acting Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, introduced a draft of the mutual 
fund provision.71 The draft gave the funds the distribution-based system they desired and limited 
it to open-end funds by expressly disqualifying closed-end funds. The draft also restricted 
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1727 (1994); 
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69 Id., at 1081. 
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controlling investments in portfolio companies. It prohibited qualifying funds from holding more 
than 10% of any class of any single issuer’s securities. Although the open-end funds did not 
object to this provision, there is also no evidence that they requested it and it seems to have 
originated with the administration. Curiously, the first draft had no corresponding breadth 
provision requiring a fund to spread its portfolio among a large number of different companies.  
The bill that ultimately passed the Conference Committee on June 1872 produced the versions 
of the breadth and depth provisions that have made their way into modern mutual fund taxation: 
mutual funds could invest no more than 5% of their portfolios in any one issuer and could own 
no more than 10% of any class of a portfolio company’s outstanding securities. Unlike the 
corresponding provision in the Revenue Act of 1942, however, which endures today and applies 
only to half of a fund’s portfolio, the provision in the 1936 Act applied to a fund’s entire 
portfolio. Representatives from the open-end funds were present in the conference committee 
meeting and were repeatedly asked for their preferences about the bill’s language.73 
There is no evidence that any significant political player thought of the portfolio restrictions 
in the Revenue Act of 1936 as having any symbolic value. It was clear to everyone after the bill 
had been passed that the mutual fund provisions had been drafted exclusively for the benefit of 
the open-end fund industry. The SEC and the closed-end fund industry did not even know the 
provisions had been proposed until they were enacted. David Schenker, chief counsel for the 
SEC’s investment trust study, said several years later at the hearings on the 1940 Act that “there 
is no legislative history upon [the 1936 tax provision]. As I remember it, it was introduced on the 
floor, and the first thing we knew was that the open-ended companies, as counterdistinguished 
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from the closed-end companies, had this tax preference.”74 Businessweek magazine reported 
shortly after the bill was passed that “New York and Chicago [i.e., the closed-end funds] blame it 
on those ‘smart Boston boys,’” and characterized the amendment, including the distribution and 
open-end provisions, as a “last-minute insertion” to the revenue bill.75 No major newspapers 
mentioned the provision as it progressed through the Senate committee, and there does not 
appear to have been any public comment on the provision by any administration official prior to 
or shortly after the Act’s passage.76 No witness from the closed-end fund industry ever testified 
on the Act, and the closed-end funds appear to have been all but ignorant of the fact that 
anything about mutual fund taxation had been proposed.77 
3. The Revenue Act of 1942 
The history of mutual fund taxation over the next six years is dominated by the closed-end 
funds’ struggle to obtain favorable tax treatment. The story picks up with the Revenue Act of 
1938.78 With the help of two Massachusetts representatives on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, the open-end funds successfully resisted an attempt to extend favorable tax treatment 
to closed-end funds,79 along with an attempt to undo open-end funds’ favorable tax treatment.80 
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In the end, the Revenue Act of 1938 passed the House with the 1936 provision, and the open-end 
funds’ exclusive ability to rely on it, intact.  
Closed-end funds finally received tax relief in 1942. By then, the political dynamic 
surrounding mutual fund taxation had changed. In return for the closed-end fund industry’s 
support of the ICA, which was enacted in 1940, the SEC had apparently agreed to offer its 
support for tax reform in 1942.81  
The history of the portfolio depth limits in the Revenue Act of 1942 suggests that even 
though these provisions did not originate with the mutual fund industry, the industry strongly 
influenced them and had little objection to their final shape. In its initial proposal to the House, 
the Treasury wanted to use the same depth and breadth standards as the ICA had for the 
definition of the term, “diversified investment company.” The ICA allowed a fund to advertise 
itself as “diversified” only if it met the 5% breadth and 10% depth standards in 75% of its 
portfolio. When witnesses from the industry testified before the Senate in July of 1942, however, 
the version of the bill they submitted loosened the breadth and depth standards.82 The version the 
industry submitted applied the breadth and depth standards only to 50% (rather than 75%) of the 
portfolio, and made up for the loosening by adding in a set of complicated but less demanding 
restrictions, including the limit that not more than 25% of a fund’s assets could be invested in the 
securities of any one issuer or any two issuers that the fund controlled. Witnesses from both 
open- and closed-end funds were unanimous in their support for the bill. The breadth and depth 
limits in the final bill mirrored exactly the industry’s proposal. 
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B. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
The centerpiece of mutual fund regulation is the ICA. Although the ICA was initially drafted 
and proposed to Congress by the SEC, the industry exercised substantial influence over many of 
the key provisions that now distinguish mutual funds from hedge funds. The final version of the 
ICA conformed very closely to the wishes of both open-end and closed-end funds and the 
industry supported the bill vigorously in spite of having had substantial political power. 
Cooperation between the SEC and the industry began with the SEC’s attempt to collect 
information for its study.83 When the information-gathering phase of the study had ended and the 
staff of the study turned to drafting recommendations, the SEC sought and received extensive 
drafting suggestions from individual funds and from committees that the industry had organized 
to help gather information.84 Representatives from the Commission stressed repeatedly in public 
how helpful these committees were.85 
All of the politically meaningful hearings on the bill took place in the Senate.86 These 
hearings began on April 2, 1940 and ended on April 26.87 Nearly every witness from the open- 
and closed-end funds began or ended his comments to the Senate by emphasizing his desire not 
just for mandatory disclosure, but also for operating restrictions that went beyond disclosure.88 
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Arthur Bunker, the Executive Vice President of the Lehman Corporation and the most influential 
figure from the closed-end fund industry in the drafting of the ICA, typified the general attitude. 
At the outset I want to make it perfectly clear that I am in favor of Federal legislation for the 
regulation of investment companies…. 
Over 3 years ago at the public hearings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
when my corporation was being examined in connection with the investigation of the 
industry, we proposed regulations which in the light of knowledge then available appeared 
adequate as a cure for such abuses as were then known to exist. They embraced, in general, a 
requirement for the most detailed publicity and disclosure, coupled with standard accounting 
practices.  
Since then, knowledge in the matter has expanded. By virtue of the 4 years’ study made by 
the S.E.C….a mass of data on the subject of investment trusts has been assembled…I am free 
to admit that the disclosure of the abuses which have existed in the past among some 
investment companies, has brought home to me the necessity for a greater measure of 
regulation than I had originally thought necessary or desirable.89 
The industry opposed several aspects of the original bill, however. The industry attacked the 
extensive delegation of authority to the SEC,90 the registration requirement for individual 
officers and directors, the SEC’s authority to deny plans of reorganization, restrictions on board 
members’ outside (rather than inside) affiliations, restrictions on mutual fund size, and 
restrictions on promotions of multiple mutual funds by the same individuals.  
Bunker was chosen by a committee comprising both halves of the industry to present a 
definitive list of requests at the end of the hearings. After the hearings ended on April 26, 1940, 
Schenker and Robert E. Healy, the SEC Commissioner with primary oversight of the mutual 
fund study and bill, met with lawyers for the closed-end and open-end companies to work out a 
new draft. The hearings reconvened a few weeks later and the new draft was ultimately enacted 
by Congress with only a handful of technical changes.  
Bunker’s requests were granted to a remarkable extent. The only requests that were not either 
clearly granted or mostly granted were unimportant. They related either to the organization of the 
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statute, such as the request that a separate title be created for unimportant instruments like face-
amount certificate companies, or to delegations of authority to the SEC, which turned out not to 
matter a great deal since the industry conceded the primary sources of authority for the SEC.  
It appears that the industry affirmatively desired much of the regulation for its own purposes 
and not merely as a capitulation to political reality or as a quid pro quo in exchange for some 
favorable tax status or other treatment. This can perhaps be inferred from the sudden increase 
that occurred in the industry’s political power as a result of the sudden outbreak of war in 
Europe. When the first round of Senate hearings ended and the SEC and industry representatives 
began gathering behind closed doors to redraft the bill on April 26, 1940, Germany had taken no 
overt military action for more than a year. But two weeks later, on May 10, while the redrafting 
was still under way, Germany invaded Belgium. Dunkirk was being evacuated on May 31 when 
the second round of Senate hearings began, and the House hearings ended on June 14, the day 
Germany occupied Paris. Congress was still meeting by the time of the House hearings only 
because the Congressional session had been extended indefinitely to prepare for war. 
The effect of the war on Congress’ docket was significant. News sources blamed the 
outbreak of war for the tabling of several pieces of domestic legislation that had had good 
chances of passing in April and early May of 1940. These included the La Follette-Thomas 
Labor Espionage Bill, amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, a wage-hour law, a 
transportation bill, the Cole Oil bill, the Silver Purchase Act, and the Walter-Logan bill.91  
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Indeed, the war’s effect was so pronounced that only a sustained lobbying effort by the 
mutual fund industry was able to save the ICA. When the Senate hearings reconvened to 
consider the new draft, the two industry lawyers who had negotiated the revisions, Alfred 
Jaretzki and Warren Motley, anxiously requested its passage.92 When the House held hearings 
two weeks later, Bunker, speaking for closed-end funds, and Merrill Griswold of MIT, speaking 
for open-end funds, confidently summarized an industry-wide effort to seek comment on the bill 
by saying that the industry’s support was unanimous.93 Fifteen witnesses appeared for the 
industry and nine letters were submitted; all urged passage of the bill and made no criticism of 
any of its provisions.94 
Several Congressmen indicated a belief that the war had diminished the bill’s chances, and 
expressed surprise at the industry willingness to support the bill in spite of this reality. Probably 
at the behest of the Boston-based open-end fund industry, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge of 
Massachusetts acknowledged on the floor of the Senate that “it is somewhat unusual, perhaps, to 
seek to pass a bill of this length at a time like this,” while the country was preparing for war, but 
argued that the bill warranted Congress’ attention “in view of the very special circumstances 
[i.e., the industry’s unanimous support], and in view of the fact that so much good can flow from 
the bill.”95 In the second round of committee hearings in the Senate, Sen. Sheridan Downey of 
California, was stunned by the SEC’s ability to achieve such complete agreement with the 
industry. “That is a most amazing thing in this chaotic world right now,” Sen. Downey observed, 
presumably referring to the sudden war in Europe and the strength it could have given to the 
industry to oppose regulation.96 “How was this miracle brought about?” 
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Schenker, an attorney for the SEC and the ICA’s principal drafter, replied, “I think I might 
fairly say that a great deal of it is attributable to the cooperative spirit of the industry.”  
The industry’s support was ultimately enough to propel the bill to swift passage. The bill 
passed committee and floor votes unanimously in both houses of Congress.97 
Some readers might argue in spite of the effect of the war and the industry’s vociferous 
support for the bill that the industry capitulated merely because it believed regulation would be 
inevitable and the industry sought the ICA simply to stave off something worse. This seems 
unlikely. Many industry sources disputed this claim both before and after the bill’s passage.98 
And one has to wonder just what the industry would have had to fear by putting off the ICA. 
Political momentum was moving against stricter regulation, not in favor of it. The SEC’s study 
of the mutual fund industry had just been published, and its salience and political significance 
would only decline with time. The New Deal was over and the public’s mood was becoming 
more conservative. And at the very moment when the industry decided to support the bill most 
vigorously, it became apparent that war in Europe would consume Congress’, the 
Administration’s and the public’s attention for years to come.  
III. The need for substantive regulation 
It appears, therefore, that the mutual fund industry had its own purposes for desiring many of 
the provisions that go beyond fraud-prevention and disclosure in mutual fund regulation. The 
question is why. Historical evidence does not thrust upon us a single and obviously correct 
answer. I now outline one possible answer, however, and then develop it by demonstrating its 
consistency with evidence regarding the growth of industry support for regulation in the 1930s.  
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A. Collective brand-building 
In the late 1930s, mutual funds, like the sellers of all mass-market products or services, 
sought to cultivate reputations to maximize their appeal. They sought to build demand for the 
kinds of investing strategies that mutual funds were well-suited to undertake. And they sought to 
demonstrate the consistency of their strategies with the investing public’s tastes. Neither open- 
nor closed-end funds wanted to be associated with holding companies, or with high leverage and 
risk. Leverage and risk had become extremely unpopular as a result of the closed-end funds’ 
spectacular collapse in 1929.99  
Many funds were not content, however, to manage their reputations on their own. They 
wanted to build an industry-wide reputation because they believed that the mass-market investors 
they targeted could not easily perceive differences among investment funds. Investors’ 
experience with particular funds may have influenced their perceptions of the entire industry, and 
individual mutual funds may have had difficulty establishing individual reputations apart from 
the industry’s reputation as a whole. In other words, mutual funds may have come to depend on a 
collective, industry-wide brand or reputation.  
This was a problem because, as described above,100 the mutual fund industry was still 
struggling for a significant share of the market for saving and investing in the 1930s. There was a 
real risk that investors might simply choose to invest in securities directly, or not to invest at all, 
rather than to invest in mutual funds or closed-end funds. 
Like many collectively owned assets, the industry-wide brand may have been subject to free-
rider problems. Individual funds internalized only a portion of the costs and benefits that their 
actions had for the reputation of the industry as a whole. And some funds may simply have 
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desired to cultivate reputations and pursue strategies that were not consistent with the reputation 
the bulk of the industry was seeking to build.  
This branding impulse is different from the bonding-related impulse that arguably underlies 
ordinary securities regulation.101 Securities regulation of ordinary operating companies has often 
been rationalized as a way of helping individual companies to commit to carrying out their 
promises. Mandatory disclosure is said to enable investors to know what a company has 
promised to do and assures them that the company will actually do it. The mutual fund industry, 
in contrast, wanted not so much to assure investors that mutual funds would operate as they 
promised, but to assure investors that mutual funds would operate in a particular way.  
The goal, in other words, may have been to standardize funds so that investors would not 
have to spend time and effort reading through prospectuses to figure out what individual funds 
had promised to do; they could rely instead on regulation to guarantee a certain approach. It is 
also important to note that unlike the bonding impulse that underlay ordinary securities 
regulation, the motivation for limiting freedom of contract for mutual funds resided in the need 
to solve a collective problem, not an individual one.  
It is plausible to think that open-end funds, in particular, could have pushed down dissents 
within the industry during the lobbying process, because in 1940 the open-end fund industry was 
highly concentrated. The five largest funds, which included the three large Boston funds that 
sought the Revenue Act of 1936, had more than 50% of the industry’s total assets, and the 
remaining 50% was widely dispersed.102 
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It is also plausible to think that mutual funds may have perceived a threat to the industry’s 
reputation from funds that operated inconsistently with industry standards. The open-end fund 
industry was growing rapidly, beyond its historically narrow confines in Boston, and the closed-
end fund industry was still struggling in the late 1930s to restore popular confidence after the 
excesses of 1929. 
B. The growth of industry support for substantive regulation 
In the early 1930s the growth of support for regulation reaching beyond fraud and disclosure 
was evident primarily in the reports of the Investment Companies Committee of the Investment 
Bankers Association of America (IBAA), which served as the closed-end funds’ main trade 
organization since most closed-end funds were organized and managed by investment banks.103 
In a manner consistent with the collective branding problem described above, the Committee saw 
the public as being incapable of understanding the ways in which the industry had changed, the 
ways in which it differed from holding companies and the ways individual funds differed from 
one another. The Committee and its members therefore demonstrated a growing conviction 
through the 1930s that industry-wide action would be necessary to manage the public’s 
perception.  
In 1930, the discount to NAV in closed-end funds was still new and there was still hope that 
it could be gotten rid of quickly. The report of the IBAA Investment Companies Committee 
expressed confidence that individual funds could eliminate their discounts by simply following 
sound disclosure practices and the NYSE’s listing rules for closed-end funds.104 Compliance 
with the NYSE standards was expected to be “a most important factor in restoring to public favor 
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many deserving investment companies whose shares are now selling below their liquidating 
value.”105  
By 1931, however, it had become apparent that the discount was not a fleeting phenomenon. 
Hope remained that it could be eliminated, but its causes and solutions had been recast. The 
Committee began to see the discount as a product not of individual funds’ bad behavior, but of 
public perception of the industry as a whole. The Committee report’s opening paragraphs said 
It is desirable that the Investment Bankers Association of America continue to make every 
effort to bring about a clearer understanding on the part of the investing public of the 
securities in which its members are interested. The Investment Companies Committee can 
perform an important service in giving the investing public a full knowledge of the 
operations of investment trusts, their possibilities and their limitations. If the public is taught 
to know exactly the sort of thing with which it is dealing when it purchases a certain type of 
investment trust security, to recognize the advantages and disadvantages of the various types, 
the danger of faulty management and practices, and the necessity of certain definitely 
announced policies, it will know more nearly what to expect from its investments and will be 
better qualified to choose between the good and the poor companies.106 
The way to eliminate the discount was not for individual funds to make information available 
about themselves; it was to improve the public’s ability to use the information already available 
and to draw clearer distinctions among funds. No individual fund could transform the investing 
public or the entire industry’s reputation on its own; industry-level action was required. 
In 1932, the Committee had clearly ceased to believe that individual funds could eliminate 
the discount on their own by complying with the NYSE standards. Therefore, all funds—
including the many funds not listed on the NYSE—were encouraged to comply with the 
standards voluntarily. Great emphasis was placed on industry-wide compliance.107  
In the mid-1930s, the Committee fixated on a slightly different problem, which also called 
for collective action: the public’s inability to distinguish mutual funds from similar vehicles. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Id. at 55. 
106 Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Convention of the Investment Bankers Association of America, 19 (1931) 
[hereinafter 1931 IBAA Proceedings]. 





chief problem was the “holding company.” The 1932 committee report called for “a clearer 
understanding of the fundamental distinction between true investment companies and the great 
host of holding, finance, and control corporations.”108 The 1933, 1934 and 1935 reports also 
expressed frustration with the public’s inability to distinguish mutual funds from similar entities 
including holding companies.109 The committee further blamed the “lack of an adequate 
description upon which the investor can readily discriminate between the various types of such 
companies” for “much of the confusion, loss and subsequent unpopularity of the companies and 
their sponsoring banking firms.”110 
The closed-end fund industry’s belief that the public was incapable of discerning fraudulent 
and inappropriately risky funds and differentiating mutual funds and holding companies was 
evident in the many manuals for novice investors published by authors connected to the closed-
end fund industry in the late 1920s and early 1930s.111 Just a few weeks prior to the crash of 
1929, for example, Paul Cravath, a prominent Wall Street lawyer,112 wrote in the introduction to 
a popular and authoritative manual on mutual funds that 
It is important that [investment trusts] should not be confused with numerous other 
meritorious enterprises…These enterprises vary in range from those organized to finance or 
manage associated or subsidiary industrial or public utility undertakings, to certain 
companies recently organized to take over blocks of securities already 
assembled….Hovering under the shadow of these meritorious but widely divergent 
enterprises there are doubtless others masquerading as investment trusts to attract the capital 
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of the unwary investor for the purpose of aiding the speculations of the unscrupulous or the 
promotions of the visionary.113 
In Cravath’s view, choosing the right closed-end fund was not easy. One source of error was the 
“other meritorious enterprises,” such as holding companies, that appeared deceptively similar to 
closed-end funds. Another was the unscrupulous trust operators “hovering under the shadow” of 
meritorious enterprises.  
The open-end fund industry was so small and kept such a low profile through the mid-1930s 
that there is relatively little record of any of its leaders voicing opinions about the condition of 
the industry as a whole. Paul Cabot of State Street Investment Trust, however, garnered public 
acclaim as a critic of the mutual fund industry and an advocate of the view that funds’ individual 
reputations were tied to the reputation of the industry as a whole. In 1928, Cabot published an 
article in the Atlantic Monthly attacking many practices then common among closed-end funds 
and prophesying that the entire industry would be affected if misconduct persisted.114 “I strongly 
believe,” Cabot wrote, “that unless we avoid these and other errors and false principles we shall 
inevitably go through a…period of disaster and disgrace. If such a period should come, the well-
run trusts will suffer with the bad.”115 After the crash, Cabot saw his prophecy vindicated, noting 
that “many now doubt that there are any ‘good investment trusts.’”116 In 1930, he attributed the 
challenges of gaining public acceptance for mutual funds to “the corrupt and unsound practices 
which have permeated the investment trust field.”117  
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114 Paul C. Cabot, The Investment Trust, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 401-408 (March 1929). The SEC submitted the 
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Hearings, 470-475. It must be mentioned that Cabot was initially hostile to the Investment Company Act in the first 
round of Senate hearings, although he ultimately supported it after the bill had been revised. 
115 Cabot, supra note 114, at 408. 
116 State Street Investment Trust, Annual Report, at 7 (Dec. 31, 1929).  
117 State Street Investment Trust, Annual Report, at 8 (Dec. 31, 1930). Cabot expressed similar sentiments again in 




The notion that federal regulation was the solution to the industry’s problems was slow in 
coming, but it gained steam in the late 1930s, perhaps partly as a result of the bad press and new 
information generated by the SEC investigation. As noted above, Arthur Bunker attributed his 
own conversion from supporting purely disclosure-based regulation to supporting more extensive 
operational regulation to the new information and publicity generated by the SEC 
investigation.118 
C. The inadequacy of alternative solutions 
Alternatives to federal law were incapable in the late 1930s of achieving the kind of 
substantive regulation the industry needed to manage its collective image. The chief problem 
with most of these alternatives was that they were inapplicable to large segments of the industry. 
Additionally, some of these mechanisms were incapable of reaching beyond disclosure.  
The NYSE began listing mutual funds in 1929119 and specified accounting standards and a 
few mild disclosure requirements in 1931 in response to pressure by the IBAA.120 The problem 
with the NYSE and other exchanges, however, was that few funds actually listed on them. Open-
end funds had little reason to list, since their shares were bought and sold only in transactions 
with the funds themselves or with brokers who sold the funds’ shares.121 And many closed-end 
funds never listed, trading only over the counter. At the end of 1936, only 54 closed-end 
companies had even one issue listed on a national securities exchange, while 59 had none.122  
Industry organizations showed similarly little promise. The open-end funds never had 
anything approximating an industry organization prior to 1940. The closest thing the closed-end 
funds had to an industry organization was the IBAA, which promulgated a set of best practices in 
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1928 and in the early 1930s encouraged compliance with accounting, disclosure and ethical 
standards. These standards, however, were vague, and the IBAA Investment Companies 
Committee had little way to enforce them.  
The 1933 and 1934 Acts were also inadequate. Few closed-end funds were required to 
register under the 1933 Act, because closed-end funds had stopped selling securities after 
1930.123 Additionally, the ’33 and ’34 Acts were only disclosure and anti-fraud statutes and 
offered uncertain authority for administrative creation of the extensive substantive regulatory 
regime the industry eventually came to desire.  
State regulation showed only limited promise. In almost all states prior to 1939, there was no 
special regulation for mutual funds.124 Prior to 1929, the National Association of Securities 
Administrators (the NASA) had promulgated a standard registration form for mutual funds, but it 
had no standard set of substantive regulations.125 New York almost became an exception in 
1928,126 but personal and political squabbles among the New York Attorney General, the 
Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate majority leader killed a bill that would have regulated 
mutual funds.127 
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Significant state regulation was not to come until 1939 when the Ohio Division of Securities 
led a number of states that year in adopting a statute called Regulation Q-3.128 The NASA 
adopted a variant of Regulation Q-3 as its model mutual fund statute in 1939129 and the open-end 
funds gladly supported it.130 But Q-3 applied only to new issues, and closed-end funds had 
ceased issuing new shares by 1930 because of the discount. And Q-3 applied only to the subset 
of open-end funds that registered new issues in states that adopted Q-3. Moreover, state 
regulators’ enforcement capacity was severely limited by resource constraints.  
D. Other explanations 
Two general explanations for the industry’s support for regulation other than the branding 
dynamic that I have identified also warrant mention. One was the closed-end fund industry’s 
desire to obtain favorable tax treatment. It had become clear by 1940 that the only way the 
closed-end fund industry could gain the Administration’s and the SEC’s support for favorable 
tax treatment was for these funds to submit to some comprehensive system of regulation. This no 
doubt partly explains the closed-end funds’ willingness to be flexible and to support the ICA’s 
passage in 1940.  
The closed-end funds’ desire for favorable tax treatment does not, however, explain why 
open-end funds supported the ICA. Indeed, the possibility that the ICA might enable closed-end 
funds eventually to obtain favorable tax treatment would have been a reason for open-end funds 
to oppose the ICA. Nor does the tax issue explain why closed-end funds did not attempt to 
squeeze more concessions out of the SEC. If the closed-end funds had desired regulation purely 
for the purpose of getting favorable tax treatment, and not did not desire regulation for its own 
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sake, they most likely would have tried to weaken the regulation as much as possible. Delaying 
the ICA for the purpose of weakening it would not necessarily have delayed favorable tax 
treatment, because the distractions generated by the war prevented closed-end funds from getting 
favorable tax treatment until 1942—two years after the passage of the ICA.  
A second explanation is the retail price maintenance provision in Section 22(d) that 
prevented brokers from discounting sales fees on open-end fund shares.131 The open-end funds 
were clearly responsible for this provision, and they inserted it after the initial round of hearings 
in the bill on the Senate, when the bill was being redrafted in negotiations between the industry 
and the SEC.132 The provision may have been useful in helping open-end funds to recruit brokers 
to sell their securities. It is unlikely, however, that this provision alone explains the open-end 
fund industry’s support for the myriad other aspects of the ICA. Additionally, the testimony of 
open-end fund industry representatives before the Senate indicated that the open-end funds were 
clearly on board with the key aspects of regulation even before § 22(d) was added. 
IV. The origins of particular provisions 
The key provisions of mutual fund tax law and regulation that separate modern mutual funds 
from modern hedge funds were influenced heavily by the mutual fund industry. 
A. Control over portfolio companies  
I make a few claims with respect to restrictions on mutual funds’ control over the operating 
companies whose securities mutual funds hold in their investment portfolios: (1) Both open- and 
closed-end mutual funds in the 1930s and early 1940s had very little interest in influencing 
portfolio companies. And what little interest they had was completely accommodated by the ICA 
and tax law. (2) Mutual funds’ passivity towards their portfolio companies grew largely out of 
the funds’ emphasis on sales. (3) Neither the SEC nor the mutual fund industry considered the 
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control restrictions to be very important, but the industry was accommodating toward the 
restrictions and had a substantial hand in drafting them. (4) The industry’s willingness to 
accommodate the restrictions can be explained partly by a combination of the collective branding 
dynamic and a desire to gain competitive advantage over holding companies. (5) There is little 
evidence that the administration used these restrictions as symbols for populist political purposes 
or that operating companies sought these restrictions to defend themselves against activist mutual 
funds.  
The ICA contains several indirect limits on mutual funds’ influence over portfolio 
companies.133 The primary restriction on control over operating portfolio companies that 
concerns me is what I have called the portfolio “depth” limitation. The Revenue Act of 1936, 
which applied only to open-end funds, prohibited an open-end fund from getting favorable tax 
treatment if it held more than 10% of the outstanding securities of any one issuer. The ICA then 
prohibited both open- and closed-end funds from advertising themselves as “diversified” unless 
they complied with a similar 10% depth limit. This limit, however, applied only to 75% of a 
fund’s portfolio and only to voting securities. The Revenue Act of 1942 replaced the Revenue 
Act of 1936 and conditioned favorable tax treatment for both closed- and open-end funds on 
compliance with a similar 10% voting security limit. This limit applied only to 50% of a fund’s 
portfolio. Compliance with the limit in the ICA is effectively optional—the only consequence of 
a fund’s failure to comply is that the fund may not advertise itself as “diversified.”134 The most 
meaningful limit, therefore, is the limit in the Revenue Act of 1942. 
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1. Minimal control over portfolio companies in the 1930s 
a. Closed-end funds 
Closed-end funds exercised some influence over portfolio companies, but this influence was 
minimal and was fully accommodated by the mutual fund regulatory and tax regime.135 Table 1 
lists the 22 largest closed-end funds by total assets for which portfolio data is available in 
Moody’s Banks, Insurance, Real Estate and Investment Trusts Manual for 1940.136 The data in 
the table reflect balance sheets at the end of 1939 and list total assets calculated using both 
market and book valuations of portfolio securities. I collected by hand each of these funds’ 
portfolios of common stocks as listed in the Moody’s manual for 1940 and matched them to the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices’ (CRSP) database of New York Stock-exchange-listed 
stocks for December 1939. The Moody’s manual lists the number of shares each fund held of 
each portfolio issuer, the book and market values of each fund’s portfolios and the values of each 
fund’s non-portfolio assets. The CRSP data include the share price of each NYSE-listed security 
at the end of December 1939 and the total number of shares outstanding.  
The 22 funds had a total of 1,501 common stocks in their portfolios. Matches to NYSE-listed 
securities in the CRSP database could be obtained for 1,179, or 79% of these portfolio stocks. 
The matched stocks account for 90% of the value of securities listed in the portfolios of these 22 
funds and 58% of the total assets of these funds as calculated using market values for securities 
portfolios. 
These data indicate that the restrictions in the Revenue Act of 1942 that ultimately applied to 
closed-end funds were permissive enough that they would have had almost no discernible effect 
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on closed-end funds’ investments in NYSE-listed companies in 1940. The average percentage of 
an issuer’s outstanding securities held in the 1,179 matched portfolio positions was just 0.6%. 
The median percentage was less than 0.2%.  
Table 2 lists all positions in which the selected mutual funds held more than 5% of an 
operating company issuer’s securities. Investments in other mutual funds are omitted. The table 
shows that the 22 mutual funds held among them only 18 positions that comprised more than 5% 
of a portfolio issuer’s securities and only 5 positions that comprised more than 10%.  
The Revenue Act of 1942 would not have directly restricted any of the positions in Table 2. 
Recall that the Revenue Act of 1942 restricted positions in excess of 10% of an issuer’s 
securities only if these positions, together with positions that comprised more than 5% of a 
fund’s total assets, made up more than half of a fund’s portfolio.  
Table 3 lists the total assets of each fund that violated the 5% breadth or 10% depth 
restrictions and shows that because the Revenue Act of 1942 applied the restrictions only to 50% 
of funds’ portfolios, only one fund, Petroleum Corp., would have been affected by these 
restrictions based on its holdings of NYSE-listed securities. The only portfolio fragmentation 
restriction that would have had any significant bite was the separate prohibition in the Revenue 
Act of 1942 on investing more than 25% of a mutual fund’s assets in the securities of one issuer 
or two or more issuers which the fund controls.137 
The ICA’s definition of “diversified,” with which compliance was required only for funds 
that wish to call themselves “diversified,” did not have any more effect on these portfolio 
positions than the Revenue Act of 1942 did. Table 3 shows that only two funds (Pennsylvania 
Industries and Petroleum Corp.) would have violated the ICA’s provision, which applies the 
breadth and depth restrictions to 75% of funds’ portfolios.  
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Anecdotal evidence supports the claim that closed-end funds had no serious interest in 
influencing operating companies. Nearly all of the many manuals published in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s for novice mutual fund investors distinguished mutual funds from holding 
companies based primarily on mutual funds’ passivity towards their portfolio companies.138 
Although closed-end funds operating close to the core of the industry were unaffected by the 
fragmentation requirements, the requirements may have had some impact on a small number of 
companies operating on the margins of the mutual fund industry. The SEC study listed a total of 
56 closed-end companies that held at least 10% or more of the outstanding voting securities of at 
least one issuer at the end of 1935.139 These 56 companies held such stakes in 187 portfolio 
companies.  
At first glance, these numbers would appear to provide solid evidence that many closed-end 
companies were affected by the 10% depth restriction in the 1942 Revenue Act. Indeed, this is 
precisely how Roe interprets these numbers, and he draws the additional inference that open-end 
companies were affected by the restrictions as well.140  
A careful reading, however, tells a more complicated story.	  The SEC divided the 56 
companies in the list into two categories: thirty-four “investment companies proper” and twenty-
two “investment holding companies.” By the definition in the SEC’s study, none of the 34 
“investment companies proper” would have violated restrictions on control over portfolio 
companies in the Revenue Act of 1942, although some of the 22 “investment holding companies” 
might have. 141 There was ambiguity about where some of these “investment holding companies” 
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fell on the holding company-mutual fund divide,142 but it appears that most of them would have 
been well outside the boundary of any plausible definition of an “investment company.” We 
cannot say precisely how these companies operated, because the SEC study does not present 
detailed data, but the available data in the study suggests that the great majority of the investment 
holding companies had portfolios that were extraordinarily concentrated—so concentrated that 
they would not have counted as investment companies under any plausible definition of an 
investment company, including the one that was eventually adopted in the Investment Company 
Act.143 Unlike closed-end funds, which were generally promoted by salespeople and investment 
banks with separate corporate existences from the funds and which actively traded stocks, it 
appears that the investment holding companies employed their managers directly and had no 
interest in active trading or in seeking out activism opportunities in portfolio companies. They 
were essentially conglomerates. 
Perhaps the best indication of just how clear the distinction between investment holding 
companies and closed-end funds had become is the simple fact that no representative from any of 
the investment holding companies listed in the SEC’s study appeared at any Congressional 
hearing on any bill related to mutual fund regulation or taxation. This is because mutual funds 
were a clearly distinct industry by 1940 and the investment holding companies faced neither the 
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than half of the total value of the portfolios of 21 of these companies. Id. at 92. All but 18 of these companies had 




opportunity nor the threat of being covered by the mutual fund tax and regulatory regime. 
Although the public may have been confused, there was little uncertainty on the part of the SEC 
and informed industry observers about what a mutual fund was. If we think of mutual funds and 
holding companies as inhabiting different points on a continuum of diversification and control 
over portfolio companies, the continuum would have had a barbell distribution, with mutual 
funds clustered at one extreme, holding companies clustered at the other, and very few 
businesses in between.  
b. Open-end funds 
The case is even clearer with respect to open-end funds. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
everyone simply knew in the 1930s that these funds had no interest in controlling portfolio 
companies. This was why open-end funds were excluded entirely from the portion of the SEC 
study that examined control over portfolio companies.144  
At the end of 1935, just prior to when the 1936 Act applied a 10% depth restriction to open-
end funds’ entire portfolios, no open-end company held 10% or more of the voting securities of 
any portfolio company.145 MIT, the largest open-end fund at the time, had only one position in 
1935 that comprised more than 3% of the issuer’s outstanding securities, and that position was 
only 3.3%.146  
The portfolio restrictions in the 1936 Act and the looser restrictions that came later gave 
open-end funds considerably more freedom than they wanted or needed. Merrill Griswold of 
MIT wrote a letter to the SEC in 1940 explaining that if the three large Boston open-end 
companies’ portfolios were combined into a single portfolio, they would own more than four 
percent of the outstanding securities of only three companies, and the largest of these three 
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combined positions would have been only seven percent.147 Indeed, Griswold expressly invited 
the SEC to impose mandatory restrictions in the ICA on the percentage of an issuer’s securities a 
mutual fund could hold.148 Griswold even offered the SEC advice on how to craft portfolio 
composition requirements most effectively to discourage control.149 The SEC tellingly declined 
this invitation.  
On rare occasions prior to 1942, open-end funds led proxy fights over high-level corporate 
governance issues.150 But this kind of activism did not reflect ownership of large control stakes, 
and it would not have violated any provision in the modern versions of the Revenue Acts of 1936 
or 1942 or the ICA. Indeed, the type and frequency of open-end funds’ activism prior to the 
advent of regulation appears to be roughly similar to the type and frequency of open-end fund 
activism in the modern era.  
2. Emphasis on sales 
The primary explanation for early mutual funds’ passivity towards their portfolio companies 
centers on the skills of the people who promoted these funds. As explained above,151 the great 
majority of closed-end funds were established during the popular investing boom of the late 
1920s and underwritten by the investment banking or brokerage houses that actually managed 
the funds. The sponsors of these funds maintained a separate corporate existence and a separate 
set of owners from the funds. Closed-end funds were thus essentially invented by brokers and 
underwriters as a way of making use of these professionals’ expertise in sales, rather than by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Letter from Merrill Griswold to R.W. Goldschmidt (Feb. 13, 1940), at 3-4 (on file with author and with MFS 
Investment Management). 
148 Griswold suggested the restrictions could substitute for restrictions on investment company size, which he 
opposed (and which the final draft of the ICA eliminated). Id., at 3-4.  
149 Griswold advised the SEC that restrictions on individual companies would be ineffective at preventing control 
and observed, “[I]n the case of two or more investment companies under the same management, there should be 
some limitation to prevent control by said several investment companies jointly.” Id. at 3.  
150 For example, MIT and an affiliated fund led a proxy fight as a shareholder of Curtiss-Wright Corp. to prevent a 
merger between Curtiss-Wright and Atlas Corp. Two Trusts Oppose Curtiss-Wright’s Merger With Atlas , WALL ST. 
J., April 16, 1940, at 2; see also Massachusetts Investors Trust, Annual Report, 4 (December 31, 1941).  




business leaders with expertise in operations management.152 As explained above, the business 
models of early mutual funds were built accordingly, with nearly all profits coming directly or 
indirectly from the sale of new shares, rather than from profits on existing funds.153  
Because they had already invested in sales outfits and had developed expertise in sales, 
mutual fund sponsors may have found that they could generate revenue more cheaply by 
devoting their limited resources to sales than by devoting those resources to the construction of 
complicated portfolio positions involving control over operating companies and the sustained 
monitoring necessary to generate value from them. Once a minimally thoughtful portfolio had 
been constructed, the marginal returns to additional marketing and sales may very well have 
been higher for mutual fund promoters than the marginal returns to more thoughtful portfolio 
construction.  
It is also possible, of course, that mutual funds’ desire to distinguish themselves from holding 
companies was driven partly by popular tastes. Holding companies were highly unpopular in the 
1930s, and mutual funds would have wanted to avoid being associated with holding companies 
both because such an association might have attracted unwanted political attention and because it 
might have reduced demand.  
Whatever the explanation for mutual funds’ passivity, mutual fund marketing in the 1930s 
had clearly developed to rationalize and promote this kind of passive investing. Marketing 
heavily emphasized diversification and expertise, and both of these concepts became 
synonymous with passivity. Theodore Grayson, a professor at the Wharton School, for example, 
described investment companies this way:  
An investment trust…is…a piece of financial machinery capable of many variations as to 
type, with many features giving it similarity to other well-recognized investment devices, as, 
for instance, the ‘holding company,’ but with two distinguishing characteristics which are 
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peculiarly its own and which should exist in every type of true investment trust. These 
features are diversification of the securities held by the trust, with consequent spreading of 
the risk involved…and expert management of the trust’s securities by the managers of the 
trust. 154 
Expertise evolved to mean passive portfolio management. Expertise was cast in scientific terms, 
and said to be best practiced in the careful evaluation of stocks, rather than in entanglements in 
portfolio companies’ actual operations.155  
Diversification also evolved to mean passivity and not merely investment in a wide array of 
stocks. In an influential manual on investment trusts, Leland Rex Robinson, an investment trust 
consultant, explained that a holding company differed from a mutual fund because “no matter 
how widely the securities in its general investment portfolio may be diversified, the holding or 
financing company is intimately concerned with the success or failure of a comparatively few 
companies in which it has acquired substantial interests.”156 
3. Motivations for seeking legal restrictions on control 
The mutual fund industry’s lack of interest in controlling portfolio companies meant that the 
restrictions on control rights were mostly a sideshow. Neither the industry nor the administration 
ever cared a great deal about them. Nevertheless, the industry and administration both exerted 
some effort in shaping the restrictions and a clear understanding of their motivations for doing so 
provides some support to my branding hypothesis.  
The industry’s primary goal in influencing the portfolio restrictions was very likely to make 
sure that the most influential mutual funds were unaffected by the restrictions. But the industry 
may have had other goals as well. Mutual funds may have perceived some anti-competitive 
benefit to keeping the handful of companies that may have sat on the border between mutual 
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funds and holding companies out of the mutual fund regulatory and tax regime. The primary 
benefit to keeping holding companies out of the investment management regulatory regime was 
most likely that holding companies would not have favorable tax treatment on the same terms as 
regulated mutual funds.  
Another benefit of putting these companies outside the boundary of the mutual fund industry 
may relate to the collective branding problem described above. Recall that closed-end fund 
leaders expressed concern in the meetings of the IBAA Investment Companies Committee in the 
early and mid-1930s about investors’ inability to distinguish mutual funds and holding 
companies.157 Forcibly distinguishing holding companies and mutual funds through tax law may 
have helped to dispel the public’s confusion. 
4. Evidence of industry involvement 
Regardless of what explanation we accept for mutual funds’ influence on the portfolio 
breadth and depth limits, it is quite clear that the mutual fund industry’s influence was strong. 
(The industry’s influence on the depth and breadth restrictions in the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 
1942 is described above in Part IV.) Mutual fund industry leaders either drafted or heavily 
influenced the language in both the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1940 that restricted mutual funds 
from owning more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of individual issuers.  
Additionally, the definition of a “diversified investment company” in the ICA reflects exactly 
the suggestions Arthur Bunker made for it in his definitive statement of the industry’s 
requests.158 This is especially telling given that Bunker chose to keep the diversification standard 
even as he requested and obtained the deletion of two other classifications (“securities trading 
company” and “securities finance company”) that appeared next to the “diversified” 
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classification in the original draft of the bill.159 Moreover, MIT expressly invited the SEC to 
draw the breadth and depth restrictions more tightly than the final draft of the ICA did, and to 
make it mandatory rather than merely optional.160 
5. Limits of populist influence 
Mark Roe has influentially argued that the portfolio depth restrictions reflect the influence of 
populist political forces and that the administration used these restrictions as symbols of its 
populist politics.161 There may be some room for populism in the story of how the control 
restrictions originated, but populism’s role seems to have been different in important ways from 
the one ascribed to it by Roe. Evidence indicates very strongly that the administration’s purposes 
in seeking the control restrictions were mainly technical and bureaucratic and that the 
administration never imbued the control restrictions with symbolic political meaning. The 
industry, too, had only weak convictions about the control restrictions. To the extent that 
populism influenced the control restrictions, it did so only through the efforts of the mutual fund 
industry itself, which may have used the control restrictions to deepen the public’s awareness 
that the mutual fund industry was already avoiding control restrictions and operating in a manner 
distinct from holding companies. 
It is clear that the administration understood by 1940 that mutual funds and holding 
companies had become distinct as a result of market forces, and that the administration had no 
desire to affect directly the way the mutual fund industry then did business. This is evident in the 
fact that the portfolio depth restrictions were only ever attached to tax statutes. The ICA—the 
main regulatory statute—conspicuously omitted any mandatory portfolio depth restrictions, even 
though it was passed at a time when tax law placed no restrictions on closed-end funds’ ability to 
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take control stakes. Additionally, the portion of the SEC study devoted to mutual funds’ control 
over portfolio companies was not published until June 1941—about a year after the ICA had 
been passed. Further, no part of the statement of policy in either draft of the ICA mentioned 
mutual funds’ control over portfolio companies.162 
There is also no evidence that the portfolio depth restrictions had any significant degree of 
public visibility or that politicians used the restrictions as a “symbol” in public discourse.163 As 
Part IV indicated, the provisions in the Revenue Act of 1936 that originated the depth restrictions 
were initiated by open-end funds and were passed so stealthily that neither David Schenker, the 
SEC’s chief mutual fund official, nor the closed-end fund industry—let alone the voting public—
even knew the restrictions had been proposed.164 There were no contemporary news reports or 
public comments by any administration official about the mutual fund tax provisions in the 
Revenue Acts of 1936 while the provisions were being debated.165 The depth restrictions in the 
ICA and the Revenue Act of 1942 similarly attracted no press attention and only dry bits of 
legislative testimony from administration officials explaining their mechanical operation and 
wording.  
Additionally, the populist political movement had waned by the time mutual fund regulation 
became publicly visible in 1940. In the late 1930s, the country had settled into a conservative 
mood.166 By 1937 the New Deal had ended and the President’s popularity and political clout had 
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greatly diminished. The war had taken over much of Congress’ and the public’s attention by the 
middle of 1940, when the ICA was passed, and the war continued its hold on the public’s 
attention through 1942, when the Revenue Act of 1942 was passed.  
This is why Roe’s argument for populist influence relies almost entirely on conjecture about 
how populist forces in the early 1930s might have influenced mutual fund regulation, rather than 
on evidence that they did influence regulation in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Roe writes 
about Roosevelt’s fear of Huey Long and Father Coughlin, for example, and he suggests that 
William O. Douglas was “a key player” in the ICA.167 But Long was assassinated in 1935 and 
Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court in early 1939, before the ICA was drafted and 
before the Revenue Act of 1942 and its portfolio depth restrictions became an issue. And in any 
event, Douglas remained very quiet on the issue of mutual funds’ influence over operating 
companies throughout his tenure at the SEC.168 
It is true that the administration had its own purposes for seeking the portfolio depth 
restrictions, but these purposes appear to have had more to do with preventing simple abuses 
than with some ideological program. The only published statement by any administration official 
about the portfolio depth restrictions in any of the legislative history of the Revenue Acts of 1936 
and 1942 is a bit of testimony by Arthur Kent, acting Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, when he introduced the first draft of the mutual fund provisions in the Revenue Act of 
1936. Kent said, 
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[The bill] does contain the safeguard that the trust or the corporation cannot be made the 
personal instrument of any one individual, because if an attempt to do that is made, it would 
be excluded by this 10-percent provision. 
…. 
There is another safeguard that the amendment contains, and that is to prevent an investment 
trust or investment corporation being set up to obtain the control of some corporation and to 
manipulate its affairs.169 
The second paragraph can be read to suggest a fear about the accumulation of power on Wall 
Street, but the first paragraph suggests a purely technical concern that the mutual fund tax 
provision might become an abusive tax shelter for individuals or operating companies. The 
concern in the second paragraph seems unlikely to have played an important role, given the total 
absence of any other evidence in debates about mutual fund regulation and tax policy that would 
indicate a desire on the part of the administration to limit investment companies’ ability to 
control their portfolio companies.  
The legitimacy of the technical concern expressed in the first paragraph is evident in 
Canada’s recent experience with mutual fund taxation.170 Until 2007 a number of ordinary 
operating companies in Canada took advantage of a tax provision that was designed for mutual 
funds and was similar to the U.S. provision, except that it lacked a portfolio depth restriction. A 
large number of Canadian operating companies put their operating businesses into fully owned 
subsidiaries of newly created trusts that qualified as mutual funds. The operating businesses then 
paid dividends in the form of interest on subordinated debt to the trusts and then deducted that 
interest from their taxable income. The trusts distributed the “interest” to investors as dividends 
and thereby avoided corporate tax, in the same way that American mutual funds can avoid tax by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 An Act to Provide Revenue, Equalize Taxation and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, pt. 11, 74th Cong. 11 (1938).  
170 See Anita I. Anand & Edward Iacobucci, An Empirical Analysis of the Governance Choices of Income Trusts 
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126426; Benjamin Alarie and Edward M. Iacobucci, Tax Policy, 




paying out income to investors. In the end, the operating companies used this device to reduce 
their tax liabilities significantly.  
Of course, it is possible to imagine alternative ways of addressing this problem that would be 
less invasive than the portfolio depth restrictions. But mutual funds in the mid-1930s and early 
1940s had so little interest in controlling operating companies that it probably was just not worth 
anyone’s time to try to devise some subtler method of solving the technical problem.  
If there was an ideological motive for the portfolio depth restrictions, it would have 
concerned mutual funds only indirectly: perhaps the administration wanted to prevent the 
holding companies from distorting themselves to take advantage of the mutual fund tax provision 
and thereby avoiding the intercorporate dividend tax that the Roosevelt administration had 
designed in 1935 for the purpose of breaking up holding companies. There is no direct evidence 
that this was the administration’s intent, but we could easily imagine why the Administration 
would have acted for this reason and this would indeed suggest an indirect role for populism in 
the story about the control restrictions’ origins. 
Additionally, populism might also have affected the shape of the mutual fund industry 
indirectly. Populist fear of holding companies and a taste among the public for mutual funds that 
exercised no control over portfolio companies might have strengthened mutual funds’ inherent 
tendency to avoid such control activities.  
It is important, however, to keep these indirect forms of populist influence in perspective. 
The restrictions did not “create” the mutual fund industry, as Roe has argued.171 The boundaries 
between mutual funds and holding companies grew spontaneously in the era before regulation as 
a response to market forces. This is why the portfolio depth restrictions were never the subject of 
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any serious controversy and it is also why no holding companies ever showed up at the hearings 
on the ICA to protest or try to prevent their inclusion in the mutual fund regulatory regime; the 
mutual fund industry’s boundaries had already been defined by circumstance before they were 
defined by law. And although the market forces that drove the distinctions between mutual funds 
and holding companies may have included the public’s distaste for holding companies, they also 
included mutual funds’ entrepreneurial origins among salespeople, who very likely could not and 
would not have satisfied any public demand for investment entities that controlled portfolio 
companies even if such demand had existed. 
Perhaps the most provocative part of Roe’s thesis is the suggestion that operating company 
managers somehow played a role in the development of the control restrictions because they 
desired (or at least did not oppose) the insulation that the restrictions may have offered from 
potential takeovers and control efforts by mutual funds.172 To be clear, Roe does not claim that 
operating company managers affirmatively sought these restrictions, only that they failed to 
lobby against the restrictions.173 Roe’s argumentative strategy here is wise, because there is 
simply no direct evidence—no legislative testimony, no news reports, no commentary in private 
letters or archives—that operating company managers cared at all about the portfolio depth 
restrictions.  
Rather than interpreting operating company managers’ silence regarding the control 
restrictions as evidence that they liked or supported the restrictions, I would interpret it as 
evidence that they simply did not care about the restrictions; the restrictions were just plain 
irrelevant. This seems like a more plausible interpretation because holding companies were just 
as silent as managers of operating companies were, and because mutual funds had never had any 
ambitions to control operating companies. Moreover, the control restrictions that Congress 
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ultimately adopted were permissive enough to allow a good deal of activism by mutual funds. 
Rather than using operating company managers’ silence to draw the inference Roe has drawn, 
therefore, we could just as easily use it to draw the opposite inference: operating company 
managers’ failure to seek even stronger control restrictions could suggest that these managers 
actually welcomed investment and control by mutual funds.  
B. Leverage and capital structure 
The mutual fund industry may also have sought or at least accepted restrictions on capital 
structure and leverage as part of an industry-wide brand-building project. The SEC originally 
proposed to prohibit all forms of borrowing by both open- and closed-end funds.174 The 
industry’s definitive statement of requests for changes to the bill asked for a provision allowing 
both open- and closed-end funds to borrow from banks with the requirement that the funds had to 
have 300% asset coverage at the time the loans were incurred.175 The industry accepted, however, 
the complete prohibition on issuance of senior securities by open-end funds and asked for 
relatively conservative limits on senior securities issuance by closed-end funds.176  
In the end, the ICA as enacted followed the industry’s proposal exactly.177 Closed-end funds 
were allowed to issue debentures and preferred stock with minimum asset coverage of 300% and 
200%, respectively, and open-end funds were prohibited from issuing senior securities.178  
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the leverage restrictions is the complete ban on senior 
securities issuance by open-end funds. It seems entirely plausible that open-end funds could have 
at least gotten the SEC to accept reasonable limits on senior securities, rather than a complete 
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177 ICA § 18(f). 




ban, given the open-end funds’ political power and the SEC’s evident willingness to accept 
reasonable limits for borrowing by closed-end funds.  
The ban on senior securities may have appealed to open-end funds, however, because up 
through 1940, the great majority of open-end funds issued only common stock. In the 1920s, the 
simplicity of these funds’ capital structures was the primary and often the only difference that 
these funds emphasized between themselves and closed-end funds.179 In time, redemption would 
become the defining feature of open-end funds, but even up through the late 1930s, capital 
structure simplicity remained an important part of the open-end sales pitch.180 This heavy 
emphasis on capital structure simplicity was probably a reaction to the complexity of closed-end 
capital structures in the late 1920s. Incorporated Investors, for example, published ads 
emphasizing that open-end funds did not have bond holders, preferred stock holders, or 
management shares, and their “entire assets” belonged “wholly and entirely to the holders of the 
common stock.”181 
A few funds, however, had begun to chip away at the uniformity of simple capital structures 
by 1940. Of the approximately 80 funds in existence in 1940, at least five, including two funds 
with assets in excess of $20 million, issued senior securities.182 This was a late 1930s 
phenomenon. Of the two large funds with senior securities in 1940, only one had senior 
securities in 1936, and that one had been very small in 1936.183 
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emphasizing only the simplicity of Incorporated Investors’ capital structure without mentioning redemption rights.) 
180 SEC Study Part 2, at 241. 
181 Grow, supra note 12, at 187. 
182 Senate Hearings, at 459-61. 
183 Quarterly Income Shares, Inc. had no senior securities in 1936, but did in 1940. Affiliated Fund, Inc. had senior 
securities in both years, but had less than $1.5 million in assets in 1936. 1936 MOODY’S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS: 
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The borrowing regime created by the ICA may have helped open-end funds to maintain the 
integrity of the reputation they had created for simple capital structures against this possible 
threat. The permission for bank borrowing gave the open-end funds significant room for 
leverage, but the restriction on senior securities prevented any open-end funds from marketing 
complicated debt securities to the public and thereby creating confusion among the public about 
the kinds of securities open-end funds offered. Much of the appeal of a share of open-end fund 
common stock was that a potential buyer did not have to spend time and effort making sure that 
he or she was indeed getting a share of common stock instead of some more exotic security. The 
ICA standardized this simplicity.  
C. Redemption 
The restrictions on redemption rights were clearly drafted by open-end funds. Section 22(e) 
of the ICA requires any fund that redeems its shares to do so within seven days of the time a 
share is tendered for redemption, except in a limited set of emergency circumstances or by order 
of the SEC. The SEC’s first draft of the ICA merely authorized the Commission to issue rules 
preventing the suspension of redemption, specifying nothing about the circumstances or time 
limitations. Bunker requested the seven-day limit and the restriction to certain emergency 
situations, along with the authorization for exemption by SEC order.184  
It is easily possible to imagine less frequent redemptions. Modern hedge funds often allow 
redemptions with substantial delays ranging from a few weeks to a quarter, and they often place 
significant restrictions on the exercise of redemption rights.185  
Starting in the late 1920s and continuing through 1940, however, redemptions in the great 
majority of open-end funds were processed daily or within a few days.186 As redemption rights 
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became increasingly central to open-end fund marketing, the frequency of redemptions and funds’ 
commitments not to prevent or curtail them gained prominence. For example, while the ICA was 
being redrafted, Incorporated Investors sent its shareholders a letter insisting, “Nothing can 
compromise the shareholder’s fundamental claim on a pro-rata share of the assets of 
Incorporated Investors, or of any other ‘open-end’ investment trust.”187 Redemption was said to 
be the most important protection investors had. 
The redemption regime may therefore have been a product of the collective branding impulse 
described above. The prospect of a few open-end funds offering complicated redemption 
schemes may have caused the large funds at the core of the open-end fund industry to fear that 
their reputation for simple and reliable redemption would be harmed. It does not appear that 
many open-end funds had begun offering more complicated redemption schemes by 1940, but 
the possibility that some funds might offer such schemes was certainly imaginable.  
D. Income distribution requirement to avoid corporate income tax 
The requirement that mutual funds distribute their income each year to avoid corporate 
income tax may have been both a historical accident and the product of rent-seeking. As Part III 
indicated, the initial suggestion for the distribution requirement came from the open-end funds 
that lobbied for the Revenue Act of 1936. There were, however, alternatives other than 
distribution for giving open-end funds pass-through tax treatment. One would have been to treat 
mutual funds as partnerships, requiring them to pass through gains and losses on a notional basis 
but not requiring actual distribution of income to shareholders. Another would have been to 
abolish some portion of corporate-level tax for mutual funds. There were significant 
administrative and practical obstacles to each of these other alternatives, but political 
circumstances may have done as much to kill them as practical obstacles did. 
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Recall that the open-end funds first proposed the distribution system after the Roosevelt 
Administration’s and the House’s proposal to apply the same system to all corporations had 
collapsed in the Senate. When the Administration’s proposal collapsed, the open-end funds 
probably saw the distribution system as the most politically feasible of the various options for 
getting pass-through tax treatment because the Administration and the House had already 
accepted the idea. Only the Senate would have to be convinced. In his memo proposing the 
distribution system to the Senate Finance Committee, Paul Cabot said the system would involve 
merely “reverting…to the theory of the House bill for investment corporations” and observed 
that he was “maintaining the original principles as laid down by the President in his message to 
Congress.”188  
Additionally, the open-end funds may have perceived in the distribution requirement a source 
of competitive advantage over closed-end funds. There is no direct evidence for this hypothesis, 
but its intuitive appeal is strong. Recall that closed-end funds could no longer sell new securities 
in 1936 because of the discount to net asset value at which they traded. An annual income 
distribution requirement would therefore have slowly bled away these funds’ assets, since they 
could not be recovered through the issuance of new shares. Distributions received by investors in 
these funds would have to be reinvested elsewhere—perhaps in open-end funds.  
At the time Cabot first proposed the distribution requirement, it was still uncertain whether 
the Revenue Act of 1936 would allow favorable tax treatment for closed-end funds (it ultimately 
restricted favorable tax treatment to open-end funds). Cabot may therefore have chosen the 
distribution requirement from among the various alternatives for pass-through tax treatment as a 
way of hedging his bets—if he could not completely limit closed-end funds’ ability to get tax 
relief, he could at least make it unattractive to them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The closed-end funds clearly understood that the distribution requirement would harm them. 
In 1940, one speaker at the IBAA conference said that extending the distribution requirement to 
closed-end funds “would in effect result in [their] gradual liquidation.”189 Closed-end funds 
sought to soften a minimum distribution requirement with respect to capital gains in the Revenue 
Act of 1942 for precisely this reason.190 
The closed-end funds’ inability to end the distribution requirement in 1942 may be 
attributable, at least in part, to the open-end funds’ support for this requirement and desire to use 
it to harm closed-end funds. The intuitive appeal of this theory is strong, since closed-end funds 
were able to revise other elements of the Revenue Act of 1942 on which their interests were 
more closely aligned with those of open-end funds, such as the portfolio depth restrictions. 
To be clear, the discount and forced income distribution have not killed the closed-end fund 
industry. The closed-end fund industry is small in comparison to the open-end fund industry,191 
but a few closed-end funds nevertheless survive because many funds that originated in the late 
1920s have managed to stay afloat by occasionally issuing new shares and because a few funds 
have been able to sell IPOs in the years since.192 
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V. Conclusion: implications for modern policy 
The standardization and branding dynamic that underlay many aspects of mutual fund 
regulation has relevance to modern readers for several reasons. One is that the dynamic has 
ambiguous consequences for investors and poses a kind of optimization problem.  
Standardization benefits investors who prefer funds that operate consistently with mandatory 
standards. By eliminating funds that do not suit these investors’ preferences, standardizing 
regulation reduces the time and effort that these investors must spend to sift appealing funds 
from unappealing funds. This benefit is distinct from the benefit that comes from bonding. 
Standardization benefits investors not by assuring them that funds will operate as they promise, 
but by assuring them that funds will operate in particular ways and that reading through 
prospectuses to figure out how funds have promised to operate is unnecessary.  
However, the branding dynamic harms investors who prefer funds that do not conform to 
regulation. Branding-related regulation reaches beyond conduct such as fraud that no investor 
would prefer and prohibits conduct that many investors rationally might prefer, such as high 
leverage and infrequent share redemptions. Investors who rationally prefer prohibited investing 
styles cannot invest in mutual funds that suit their preferences. 
Balancing the costs and benefits of branding-related regulation thus involves a kind of 
optimization problem: reductions in search costs must be balanced against the cost of preventing 
many investors from obtaining what they desire. It is unclear whether the balance was struck 
optimally in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and since much has changed since then, it is surely 
worth considering whether the balance remains optimal in the present.  
The branding and standardization dynamic is also interesting because it may be possible to 
achieve some of the benefits of branding and standardization with fewer of the costs than under 




other matters could be loosened and tighter restrictions could be devised that apply only to funds 
that opt into various special regulatory regimes.193 Money market fund rules are an example of 
one such regime, since they apply only to funds that opt into the rules by marketing themselves 
as “money market funds” or by maintaining constant share prices. Setting the boundaries and 
number of other optional categories would involve an optimization problem of its own. Too 
many categories would create the very complexity that standardization seeks to avoid. 
Consider as an example of this optimization problem the restrictions on redemption rights in 
the ICA. Daily redemption rights benefit investors by giving them exceptional liquidity. But the 
need to meet frequent redemptions forces funds to maintain large cash reserves that could 
otherwise be invested and to sell their portfolio securities earlier than they otherwise might, 
generating premature capital gains tax liabilities. This is why most hedge funds redeem only 
once per month or quarter. Perhaps the benefits of standardization could be achieved at lower 
cost by devising different regulatory classes with different redemption regimes. Similar 
considerations apply, for example, to restrictions on leverage.  
A clear understanding of the branding dynamic’s historical role is also useful because a 
version of this dynamic may continue to affect regulatory politics in the present. Money market 
fund regulation, for example, was largely written in the 1970s by the mutual fund industry. This 
regulation is enormously important: money market funds today hold almost four trillion dollars 
in assets and are widely thought of as a “shadow banking industry.”194  
Regulation forces money market funds into highly conservative investments. But this 
regulation is probably less about “protecting” investors from risky investments than it is about 
magnifying the value of branding and standardization in a narrow context. Investors are not 
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“protected” from risk by the money market fund rules, because investors remain free to invest in 
penny stocks, lottery tickets and other risky assets if they so desire. And although money market 
funds are highly conservative, there are many types of short-term bond funds that are just as 
conservative or even more conservative than money market funds but nevertheless do not opt 
into the money market fund regulatory regime.  
Rather than serving an investor protection function, the money market fund rules serve 
primarily a branding function: they relieve investors of the burden of reading prospectuses. The 
rules standardize money market funds and assure investors that all money market funds operate 
in essentially the same ways, making the process of choosing a money market fund much easier. 
This is why the mutual fund industry has strongly supported these rules over the years. 
The branding dynamic that originally underlay investment management regulation suggests 
that the mutual fund industry will alternately fight and advance reforms of the money market 
fund rules in ways that reflect the industry’s priorities for defining its brand. Money market 
funds’ most unique element is the pricing of their shares: they maintain a constant price of $1 per 
share, even when their actual NAVs deviate from $1 per share. It is widely understood that 
constant pricing destabilizes money market funds and makes them vulnerable to runs, because if 
a fund’s NAV declines to less than $1 and the fund’s ability to continue redeeming at $1 is in 
doubt, shareholders have an incentive to get out quickly, before the fund starts redeeming at less 
than $1.195 The constant pricing feature is an important element of money market funds’ 
branding, however, because it creates the illusion that these funds offer fixed claims similar to 
bank accounts, even though they technically offer only equity shares.  
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In response to several money market funds’ inability to maintain their constant pricing during 
the recent financial crisis, the SEC adopted rule changes that forced money market funds into 
even more conservative investments.196 Prior to the rule changes, the SEC had also called for 
comments on eliminating the constant pricing system and there was a great deal of public 
discussion about eliminating the constant pricing system.197 Since the constant share pricing is an 
important element of these funds’ branding, the industry fought vigorously to maintain it. The 
industry generally supported, however, the SEC’s efforts to require more conservative investing 
strategies.198 The enforcement of conservative investing strategies is more appealing to the 
industry because it helps to prevent damage to money market funds’ collective reputation for 
conservatism, which is another important element of their branding. We can expect a similar 
dynamic in the current fight about target-date funds, for which the SEC has recently proposed a 
special set of rules to help standardize the marketing of these funds.199 
This paper also has something to say about mutual fund tax policy. The value and necessity 
of the annual income distribution system have often been criticized.200 The only question is 
whether some less destructive alternative is workable in practice, given mutual funds’ enormous 
size and number of shareholders. My contribution here is to observe that the annual income 
distribution came into being long before mutual funds attained their present size and widely 
dispersed ownership and to show that the annual distribution requirement had its origins largely 
in a historical accident and rent-seeking. 	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Table 1. Largest Closed-End Investment Companies in Moody's Investment Trusts Manual, 1940 
Fund Name Total Assets with Portfolio 
Securities Valued at Cost 











Atlas Corporation 74.47 63.08 51.22 
Lehman Corporation 67.47 68.62 64.88 
Niagara Share Corp. of Maryland 59.06 30.06 28.53 
Empire Power Corp. 51.38 36.92 22.91 
Adams Express Co. 44.27 29.13 25.00 
Tri-Continental 43.79 38.56 30.53 
United States & International Securities Corp. 43.70 29.96 29.56 
Blue Ridge Corp. 37.50 36.29 34.96 
United Gas & Electric Corp. 37.20 24.31 21.64 
Selected Industries 35.64 33.85 30.95 
United States & Foreign Securities Corp. 33.81 36.31 35.07 
Chicago Corp. 31.39 31.98 25.63 
Petroleum Corp. 31.29 22.18 21.21 
General American Investors 26.48 30.32 28.48 
American General Corp. 25.77 23.96   
General Shareholdings Corp. 21.33 16.43 14.70 
American International Corp. 20.20 18.73 15.69 
Amoskeag Co. 15.76 12.55 11.33 
American European Securities Co. 13.86 11.16 10.91 
Consolidated Investment Trust 13.54 14.41 13.01 
Utility and Industrial Corp. 12.77 2.34 2.27 





Sources: Center for Research In Securities Prices, 1940 Moody's Manual on Banks, Insurance, Real Estate, Investment Trusts
Table 2: Large Closed-End Fund Stakes in Portfolio Issuers in Excess of 5% of  

















 Dollar Value 
of Holding  
Pennsylvania Industries Pittsburgh Steel Co. 35.1% 25.0%  $ 1,306,557  
Chicago Corp. Dixie Vortex Co. 15.7% 1.2%  $ 373,956  
Pennsylvania Industries Sharon Steel Corp. 14.0% 13.2%  $ 687,500  
Atlas Corporation Radio Keith Orpheum Corp. 12.0% 0.6%  $ 388,015  
Niagara Share Corp. of Maryland Insuranshares Certificates Inc. 12.0% 1.5%  $ 440,625  
Adams Express Co. Atlantic Gulf & West Indies SS 9.0% 0.9%  $ 270,000  
Lehman Corporation Simms Pete Co. 8.8% 0.2%  $ 108,181  
Petroleum Corp. Consolidated Oil Corp. 8.7% 40.5%  $ 8,976,375  
General American Investors Allied Stores Corp. 8.1% 3.2%  $ 962,500  
Atlas Corporation Greyhound Corp. 8.0% 5.3%  $ 3,350,000  
American International Corp. Texas & Pac. Railway Co. 6.6% 1.7%  $ 316,050  
Chicago Corp. Pacific American Fisheries Inc. 6.4% 0.3%  $ 102,500  
Selected Industries Kansas City Southern Railway Co. 6.1% 0.4%  $ 128,800  
Chicago Corp. American Ship Building Co. 6.0% 0.8%  $ 268,304  
Adams Express Co. International Mining Corp. 5.7% 0.7%  $ 216,000  
United States & International Securities Corp. St. Louis San Francisco Railway 
Co. 
5.7% 0.0%  $ 9,250  
Adams Express Co. Underwood Elliot Fisher Co. 5.5% 3.2%  $ 942,788  




Table 3. Large Closed-End Fund Investments in NYSE-Listed Securities That Would Have Violated Revenue Act of 1942 





Percent of Total 
Assets in 
Violation of 5% 




















Revenue Act of 





Petroleum Corp. 0.648 4 0 Y Y 
Blue Ridge Corp. 0.493 3 0 N N 
Pennsylvania Industries 0.491 4 2 Y Y 
Selected Shares Corp. 0.472 6 0 N N 
American International Corp. 0.394 2 0 Y Y 
Selected Industries 0.271 4 0 N N 
American European Securities Co. 0.252 4 0 N N 
General Shareholdings Corp. 0.234 2 0 N N 
Atlas Corporation 0.059 1 1 N N 
United States & International Securities Corp. 0.055 1 0 N N 
Niagara Share Corp. of Maryland 0.015 0 1 N N 
Chicago Corp. 0.012 0 1 N N 
Utility and Industrial Corp. 0.000 0 0 N N 
United States & Foreign Securities Corp. 0.000 0 0 N N 
United Gas & Electric Corp. 0.000 0 0 N N 
Tri-Continental 0.000 0 0 N N 
Lehman Corporation 0.000 0 0 N N 
General American Investors 0.000 0 0 N N 
Empire Power Corp. 0.000 0 0 N N 
Consolidated Investment Trust 0.000 0 0 N N 
Amoskeag Co. 0.000 0 0 N N 
American General Corp. 0.000 0 0 N N 
Adams Express Co. 0.000 0 0 N N 
Sources: Center for Research in Securities Prices, 1940 Moody's Manual on Banks, Insurance, Real Estate, Investment Trusts 
